Files
codex-app-server/chv-guest/chv_browser_guard.py
T
host 1c8fc3f7c8 对齐 Muse P4:浏览器完全对齐(CDP broker 单元外 + a11y-tree-only + 确定性分类器)
- chv-guest/chv-cdp-broker.py(新):单元外 CDP broker,用户 chv-browser,
  独家 chromium.launch(headless=True, args=LAUNCH_ARGS);启动参数白名单
  无 --remote-debugging-port、无 devtools;导航前 URL 校验 + 拦截名单;
  快照恒带 untrusted_input 与 injection_flags;高风险表单在页时 open
  即 ask 入队;观测到导航 POST 自动暂停;命中拦截规则的下载取消 + 暂停
  + ask;全部回包与错误经 sanitize_error + response_leaks 检查。
- chv-guest/chv-browser.py(P2 版重构):改为 broker 客户端,不再直连
  Playwright(本文件无 playwright import),保留 URL 校验 + 快照截断
  作为第二层防线;暂停状态与 broker 同步。
- chv-guest/chv_browser_guard.py(新):纯 stdlib 共享规则——validate_url、
  拦截名单加载/匹配、快照截断、错误消毒(去 HTML、截断 200 字符、凭据形
  key=value 与 sk- 形 token 打码)、注入启发式(中英文各 6 条)、表单风险
  扫描、下载扫描(可执行扩展名)、文件型 ask 队列(pending/allowed/denied,
  与 P3 ApprovalQueue 同语义)、启动参数与回包泄露检查、脚本注入面
  禁止清单(FORBIDDEN_PAGE_ATTRS/FORBIDDEN_OPS)。
- chv-guest/browser-blocklist.txt(新):静态拦截名单;首版只有 RFC 2606
  .test 自测条目,生产条目由运维构建时填入,无在线更新。
- chv-guest/build.sh/buildinfo.py:P2 三脚本 + P4 三文件纳入镜像与
  buildinfo;新增 chv-cdp-broker.service 与 /run/chv/ask-queue tmpfiles。
- docs/chv-muse-p4-gap.md(新):现状 vs Muse 官方要求差距表、改动、
  诚实边界、P2 合入约定、真机待验证清单(round 12)。
- docs/chv-production-readiness.md:补 §15(P4 一节;编号合入时若与
  P2 的 §15 撞,顺延)。
- cloud/tests/test_chv_muse_p4.py(新,36 项):guard 单元、AST 钉住
  禁止属性、假 Playwright broker 测试、假 broker agent 测试、真 Unix
  socket 联调、buildinfo/build 干跑断言;含否定测试(evaluate 被拒、
  DOM 外泄被拒、DevTools 不可达、私有地址被拒、高风险表单被拦、
  注入文本被标注)。

测试:P4 新测试 36/36;全量 cloud 套件 1903 项,两次连续全过
(skipped=8)。附记:第一次全量跑出 1 个失败但输出未保留、后两次
均未复现,疑为时序抖动,未追认。
真机验证未做:排队等 round-11/第三棒释放 100.65.51.33,清单见 gap
表 §5。本地提交,未推未合未部署。
2026-11-06 22:36:56 +00:00

387 lines
15 KiB
Python
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""chv_browser_guard:浏览器安全共享纯函数(客机侧)。
对齐 Muse P4(见 docs/chv-muse-p4-gap.md):本模块只放纯函数,
不 import playwright、不起进程、不连网络,供 chv-cdp-broker.py
与 chv-browser.py 两脚本共用,避免三份拷贝漂移。
内容:
validate_url P2 的 URL 规则:只 http/https,拒 localhost/
私有地址字面量(DNS 重绑定是 Sentinel 的事)。
check_blocklist 静态恶意站名单(browser-blocklist.txt)后缀匹配。
truncate_a11y P2 的无障碍树截断(200 节点/64KB)。
sanitize_error 错误信息消毒:去 HTML 标签、截断 200 字符、
仍含尖括号即只留异常类型名——快照路径上不许有
原始 DOM/HTML 外泄口子。
detect_injection DOM 内提示注入启发式(中英文模式表,命中返标签;
是规则,不是模型分类器)。
detect_form_risk 无障碍树扫密码/支付字段。
scan_download 下载扫描钩子:一条可执行扩展名规则。
enqueue/list/resolve_ask 文件型待审批队列(与 P3 ApprovalQueue
同语义:pending/allowed/denied)。
LAUNCH_ARGS / FORBIDDEN_PAGE_ATTRS Chromium 启动参数白名单与
禁用的 Playwright 页面调用名表。
"""
import json
import os
import re
import time
import uuid
MAX_A11Y_NODES = 200
MAX_A11Y_CHARS = 65536
MAX_ERROR_CHARS = 200
# 拒绝的 URL 主机:localhost 与私有地址字面量(P2 原样)。
_PRIVATE_HOST_RE = re.compile(
r"^(localhost|127\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+|10\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+|"
r"172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.\d+\.\d+|192\.168\.\d+\.\d+|"
r"\[::1\]|\[fe8[0-9a-f]*:.*\])$",
re.IGNORECASE)
# Chromium 启动参数白名单:均为真实开关;刻意没有
# --remote-debugging-port(DevTools 不暴露)与 --no-sandbox
#(浏览器以非 root 的 chv-browser 身份跑,不降级沙箱)。
LAUNCH_ARGS = [
"--disable-gpu",
"--no-first-run",
"--disable-dev-shm-usage",
"--disable-extensions",
"--disable-background-networking",
"--disable-sync",
"--disable-translate",
"--mute-audio",
]
# 禁用的 Playwright 页面调用名:页面上下文 JS 与进程内 exec
# 的全部入口。broker 与子代理的代码里不得出现这些属性名,
# 测试用 AST 扫两个脚本钉住(字符串常量里的出现不算)。
FORBIDDEN_PAGE_ATTRS = (
"evaluate", "evaluate_handle", "add_script_tag",
"add_init_script", "expose_function", "set_content",
"keyboard", "mouse", "touchscreen",
)
# 浏览器 socket 白名单之外的操作名(子代理层拒绝)。
FORBIDDEN_OPS = (
"evaluate", "content", "devtools", "js", "click", "fill",
"type", "press", "hover", "select", "check", "route",
"expose", "add_init_script", "add_script_tag", "set_content",
"eval",
)
# 下载拦截:可执行扩展名(一条规则;后续规则只加条目)。
BLOCKED_DOWNLOAD_EXTS = frozenset({
".exe", ".msi", ".bat", ".cmd", ".ps1", ".sh", ".dmg",
".pkg", ".apk", ".scr", ".vbs", ".com", ".gadget",
})
# 提示注入启发式模式表(中英文各 6 条):字面匹配,不是语义判断。
# 命中只做标注(untrusted + injection_flags),不做拦截决定。
INJECTION_PATTERNS = (
("en_ignore_instructions", r"ignore (all )?(previous|prior|above) instructions"),
("en_you_are_now", r"you are now (a|an|the)"),
("en_system_prompt", r"(reveal|show|print|disregard).{0,40}system prompt"),
("en_disregard", r"disregard (all )?(previous|prior|above)"),
("en_new_instructions", r"new instructions:? (you|to|do)"),
("en_jailbreak", r"(jailbreak|DAN mode|do anything now)"),
("zh_ignore", r"忽略(以上|之前|所有|先前)的?(指令|指示|提示)"),
("zh_pretend", r"假装你是"),
("zh_now_you_are", r"你现在是"),
("zh_leak_prompt", r"(泄露|泄漏|输出|打印).{0,20}系统提示"),
("zh_admin", r"以管理员(身份|权限)"),
("zh_no_limit", r"(无视|绕过).{0,20}(限制|规则|审查)"),
)
# 表单风险:无障碍树节点名/autocomplete 里的敏感词(小写匹配)。
PASSWORD_HINTS = ("password", "密码", "current-password",
"new-password", "passwd", "pass word")
PAYMENT_HINTS = ("payment", "支付", "信用卡", "银行卡", "卡号",
"cc-number", "cc-exp", "cc-csc", "cc-name",
"card number", "cvv", "expiry", "有效期")
def validate_url(url):
"""URL 校验:只允许 http/https,且主机不是 localhost/私有地址
字面量。返回 (ok, error)。"""
if not isinstance(url, str) or not url:
return False, "url 不能为空"
m = re.match(r"^(https?)://([^/]+)", url, re.IGNORECASE)
if not m:
return False, "只允许 http/https URL:%s" % url[:80]
host = m.group(2).split("@")[-1].split(":")[0].lower()
if _PRIVATE_HOST_RE.match(host):
return False, "拒绝 localhost/私有地址:%s" % host
return True, ""
def url_host(url):
"""取 URL 的主机小写形式;取不到返回空串。"""
m = re.match(r"^(https?)://([^/]+)", url or "", re.IGNORECASE)
if not m:
return ""
return m.group(2).split("@")[-1].split(":")[0].lower()
def load_blocklist(path):
"""读静态拦截名单:每行一个条目(域名或 .后缀),# 开头是注释,
空行跳过。文件缺失即空名单(不静默编造条目)。"""
entries = set()
try:
with open(path) as fh:
for line in fh:
line = line.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#"):
continue
entries.add(line.lower())
except OSError:
return set()
return entries
def check_blocklist(host, entries):
"""主机是否命中拦截名单:精确匹配或后缀匹配(条目 .example.com
命中 a.example.com;条目 example.com 同样命中子域)。"""
host = (host or "").lower()
if not host or not entries:
return False
for entry in entries:
entry = entry.lstrip(".")
if host == entry or host.endswith("." + entry):
return True
return False
def truncate_a11y(node, max_nodes=MAX_A11Y_NODES,
max_chars=MAX_A11Y_CHARS):
"""截断无障碍树:节点数超上限时剪掉多余子树。返回 (tree, truncated)。
P2 原样搬入(两脚本共用,不再各存一份)。"""
state = {"count": 0, "truncated": False}
def walk(n):
if not isinstance(n, dict):
return n
state["count"] += 1
if state["count"] > max_nodes:
state["truncated"] = True
return None
out = {}
for key, value in n.items():
if key == "children" and isinstance(value, list):
children = []
for child in value:
walked = walk(child)
if walked is None:
state["truncated"] = True
break
children.append(walked)
out[key] = children
else:
out[key] = value
return out
tree = walk(node)
text = json.dumps(tree, ensure_ascii=False)
if len(text) > max_chars:
state["truncated"] = True
tree = {"role": (node or {}).get("role"),
"name": (node or {}).get("name"),
"truncated_chars": True}
return tree, state["truncated"]
def sanitize_error(exc):
"""错误信息消毒:只留异常类型名 + 去 HTML 标签、截断后的首行;
凭据形内容(token=/password= 等 key=value 与 sk- 形 token)打码;
清洗后仍含尖括号或 javascript: 即丢弃原文。绝不把页面原文
或凭据原样放进回包或日志。"""
name = type(exc).__name__ if not isinstance(exc, str) else "Error"
text = exc if isinstance(exc, str) else str(exc)
text = re.sub(r"<[^>]{0,500}>", "", text)
text = re.sub(r"(?i)(token|password|passwd|secret|api[-_]?key)"
r"\s*=\s*[^\s&;\"']+", r"\1=<redacted>", text)
text = re.sub(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}", "<redacted>", text)
text = " ".join(text.split())[:MAX_ERROR_CHARS]
if "<" in text or ">" in text or "javascript:" in text.lower():
return "浏览器操作失败(%s)" % name
if not text:
return "浏览器操作失败(%s)" % name
return "浏览器操作失败(%s):%s" % (name, text)
def _collect_text(node, out):
"""收集无障碍树里全部字符串值(name/value/description 等),
供注入启发式扫描。只收字符串,不收 role 名以外的结构。"""
if isinstance(node, dict):
for value in node.values():
_collect_text(value, out)
elif isinstance(node, list):
for item in node:
_collect_text(item, out)
elif isinstance(node, str):
out.append(node)
def detect_injection(tree):
"""DOM 内提示注入启发式:扫描快照全部文本,返回命中的模式标签
列表(去重、按模式表顺序)。无命中即空列表。规则而已,不是
模型分类器——命中只标注,不拦截。"""
texts = []
_collect_text(tree or {}, texts)
blob = "\n".join(texts)
hits = []
for label, pattern in INJECTION_PATTERNS:
if re.search(pattern, blob, re.IGNORECASE):
hits.append(label)
return hits
def _node_hints(node, hints):
"""一个无障碍树节点的 name/autocomplete/type 里是否含敏感词。"""
blob = " ".join(str(node.get(k, "")) for k in
("name", "autocomplete", "type", "description"))
blob = blob.lower()
return any(h in blob for h in hints)
def _walk_form_risk(node, found):
if not isinstance(node, dict):
return
role = str(node.get("role", "")).lower()
if role in ("textbox", "textfield", "combobox"):
if _node_hints(node, PASSWORD_HINTS):
found.setdefault("password", []).append(
str(node.get("name", ""))[:40])
elif _node_hints(node, PAYMENT_HINTS):
found.setdefault("payment", []).append(
str(node.get("name", ""))[:40])
for child in node.get("children") or []:
_walk_form_risk(child, found)
def detect_form_risk(tree):
"""扫无障碍树里的密码/支付字段。返回 {level, fields}:level 是
none/password/payment(支付优先于密码),fields 是命中的字段名
(最多 5 个,供审批记录看,不进模型上下文原样只作标注)。"""
found = {}
_walk_form_risk(tree or {}, found)
if found.get("payment"):
return {"level": "payment",
"fields": found["payment"][:5]}
if found.get("password"):
return {"level": "password",
"fields": found["password"][:5]}
return {"level": "none", "fields": []}
def scan_download(filename):
"""下载扫描钩子(一条规则):可执行扩展名、或中间段含可执行
扩展名(双扩展名把戏,如 report.pdf.exe / archive.exe.pdf),
即拦。返回 (blocked, reason)。"""
name = (filename or "").strip().lower()
if not name:
return False, ""
parts = [p for p in name.split(".") if p]
if len(parts) < 2:
return False, ""
final_ext = "." + parts[-1]
if final_ext in BLOCKED_DOWNLOAD_EXTS:
return True, "可执行扩展名:%s" % final_ext
for middle in parts[1:-1]:
if ("." + middle) in BLOCKED_DOWNLOAD_EXTS:
return True, "双扩展名可疑:%s" % filename[:60]
return False, ""
def check_launch_args(args):
"""Chromium 启动参数校验:不得含 --remote-debugging-*(DevTools
不暴露),不得含 devtools 字串。返回 (ok, error)。"""
for arg in args or []:
if arg.startswith("--remote-debugging"):
return False, "启动参数不得含 %s" % arg
if "devtools" in arg.lower():
return False, "启动参数不得含 DevTools:%s" % arg
return True, ""
def _ask_path(queue_dir, ask_id):
return os.path.join(queue_dir, "ask-%s.json" % ask_id)
def enqueue_ask(queue_dir, kind, url, detail):
"""待审批入队:一条 ask 一个 JSON 文件(原子写:先写 tmp 再
rename)。返回 ask_id。队列目录不存在即建。"""
os.makedirs(queue_dir, exist_ok=True)
ask_id = uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]
record = {"ask_id": ask_id, "kind": kind, "url": url or "",
"detail": detail or "", "status": "pending",
"created_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ",
time.gmtime())}
tmp_path = _ask_path(queue_dir, ask_id) + ".tmp"
with open(tmp_path, "w") as fh:
json.dump(record, fh, ensure_ascii=False)
fh.write("\n")
os.replace(tmp_path, _ask_path(queue_dir, ask_id))
return ask_id
def list_asks(queue_dir):
"""列出待审批(status pending)的 ask,按创建时间排序。"""
out = []
try:
names = sorted(os.listdir(queue_dir))
except OSError:
return []
for name in names:
if not (name.startswith("ask-") and name.endswith(".json")):
continue
try:
with open(os.path.join(queue_dir, name)) as fh:
record = json.load(fh)
except (OSError, ValueError):
continue
if record.get("status") == "pending":
out.append(record)
out.sort(key=lambda r: r.get("created_at", ""))
return out
def resolve_ask(queue_dir, ask_id, decision):
"""写回审批决定:decision 只认 allowed/denied。返回 (ok, error)。
不存在的 ask_id 即报错,不静默成功。"""
if decision not in ("allowed", "denied"):
return False, "decision 只认 allowed/denied:%s" % decision
path = _ask_path(queue_dir, ask_id)
try:
with open(path) as fh:
record = json.load(fh)
except (OSError, ValueError):
return False, "ask 不存在:%s" % ask_id
if record.get("status") != "pending":
return False, "ask 已处理:%s" % ask_id
record["status"] = decision
tmp_path = path + ".tmp"
with open(tmp_path, "w") as fh:
json.dump(record, fh, ensure_ascii=False)
fh.write("\n")
os.replace(tmp_path, path)
return True, ""
def response_leaks(resp):
"""回包泄露检查(测试与 broker 自检共用):递归扫响应里的字符串,
命中 ws://、DevTools 字串或 HTML 标签即返回问题列表。空列表即干净。"""
problems = []
text = json.dumps(resp, ensure_ascii=False)
if "ws://" in text or "wss://" in text:
problems.append("响应含 ws 端点")
# 只查 CDP 形态(devtools/ 路径、remote-debugging),不查裸词——
# 正常 URL 里也可能含 devtools(如 devtools.example.com)。
if re.search(r"devtools/", text, re.IGNORECASE):
problems.append("响应含 DevTools 路径")
if "remote-debugging" in text.lower():
problems.append("响应含 remote-debugging")
if re.search(r"<[a-zA-Z][^>]{0,200}>", text):
problems.append("响应含 HTML 标签")
return problems