- test_skill_appendix_sync: all 9 appendix chapters 00..08 in order,
body role-matrix set == appendix role-title set, authority
statement on both sides, GitHub guarantee in body + named
appendix chapters 00/04/07, seeded copy byte-identical with
full appendix. Previously only 00/08 existence was asserted.
- test_skill_seed_pinning: only SKILL.md copied (pack extras never
land, never resurrected), tenant extras left alone, tenant-modified
SKILL.md never overwritten across repeats, identical = noop,
deleted SKILL.md re-seeded (documented boundary, not deletion
preservation).
- skill_seed.py: evaluation note only (why whole-dir copy is not
done); no code change.
- CostStore: per-model breakdown, report_by_creator (JOIN tasks.created_by),
dual-column reports with priced_usd_micros, unpriced_models listed
separately and a billing note (proxy price, not the relay bill);
_report itself untouched, old exact-key tests keep passing.
- Hard cutoff: cost.quota_cutoff_reason is the single USD/unpriced-cap
decision; worker._quota_exceeded now delegates to it (identical
messages); claim gate, turn boundary and poll kill stop spend and
record interrupted + quota reason + audit; auto-resume re-checks
live quota before requeueing.
- Approval timeout (G7 ops metric): cloud/approval_timeout.py —
default stays 600s, >20% timeout rate recommends 1800s, <5% keeps,
mid-range keeps; stats + recommendation + info log; wired into
/metrics (member projects, no log spam) and a global-admin
/admin/ops/approval-timeout endpoint (sweeps overdue first).
- Server: task/project cost endpoints return dual-column reports;
new GET /users/me/cost and GET /admin/cost-by-creator.
- Tests: cloud/tests/test_cost_quota.py, 10 tests.
Core artifacts travel as an explicit manifest; coordinator triple-checks
(core report vs manifest vs recomputed hash) before cleanup, regression
rewrites files verbatim, recomputes sha256, stops on ARTIFACT-HASH-MISMATCH
and only then runs the same core code plus import-only regression tests.
GET /full-auto/status, GET /full-auto/config-plan, POST
/full-auto/validate-action|merge-gate|ci-fix|release-plan|
rollback-plan, POST /full-auto/execute (global admin only,
FULL_AUTO_ENABLED + verified installation + branch protection
verified via GitHub API, else 403 + audit), GET /full-auto/audit.
Guards reused from cloud/full_auto.py; token only in Authorization
header; audit via audit_record redaction into AuthStore audit_log.
Only pure computation/validation sub-blocks of _handle_github_webhook,
_create_followup, _deliver_to_thread and _task_chat_history are extracted;
all DB writes, audits, external calls and side-effect blocks stay in the
callers, error strings/codes and response shapes verbatim. _deliver_to_thread
uses the shared goal classifier only for /goal input: its non-goal terminal
path still goes to CAS revive (not 409) and its merged path keeps its own
wording. New tests: test_longfunc_remaining.py (15).
_continue_task 226->168 via _validate_continue_options;
_task_wait 158->139 via _validate_wait_params;
_task_thread_read 187->152 via _summarize_trace_entries;
_metrics 123->104 via _summarize_metrics_tasks.
No behaviour, message, status or route change; error strings verbatim.
New tests: test_longfunc_extra (9). Cloud full suite: 1439 OK, skipped=4.
Follows #229 pattern; must merge after #229 and be rebased/checked then.
Move the /tasks/* sub-route out of _dispatch into _dispatch_task_route
(query passed explicitly; the files/tree/thread branches use it), move
the push-subscription DELETE branch out of _dispatch_project into
_project_push_subscription_delete, and turn the goal-validation block
of _create_task into the pure module function
_validate_task_goal_options (returns error string instead of sending
400, caller sends it unchanged). Statements are moved verbatim except
indentation and the goal send+return -> return-error transform; no
behaviour change. server.py module split intentionally not done: it
remains a larger, higher-risk refactor.
Add test_longfunc_split covering the pure goal validator's success
paths and all eight error strings.
- ensure_workers_table: new tables include host TEXT, pid BIGINT,
address TEXT; old tables gain them via _ensure_hostpid_columns
(PRAGMA column check, missing-only ALTER, old rows keep NULL,
never fabricates host/pid). SQLite and Postgres share this path
(PG via the db adapter's PRAGMA translation); POSTGRES_SCHEMA
deliberately still excludes workers, which is volatile heartbeat
data in UNMIGRATED_TABLES (adding it broke the P2 migration
alignment tests, verified and reverted).
- heartbeat/register: given host/pid/address refresh, omitted
values preserve the old row; address has no derived source.
Local worker passes host_name + own pid; HTTP heartbeat only
stores caller-supplied values, never the server's own.
- classify_stale_workers: kill only when age strictly exceeds the
threshold AND host matches local host AND pid is proven dead;
equal threshold, foreign host, missing pid, or live/unknown pid
are list_only. Classification only, never kills, never matches
by name/prefix, never touches infra containers.
SKILL.md header pointed at same-dir README.md but the pack had no
such file (CHANGELOG was supplied by #217, README was not). This
track adds the README only: purpose, chapter map, appendix
provenance entry point, seeding behaviour, and known boundaries.
It states no rule, changes no SKILL.md semantics, and does not
duplicate the CHANGELOG/script explanations -- overlapping parts
are pointers, with an explicit division-of-labour section.
Deletion retention is written only as the tombstone-design
placeholder, deferring to the skill_seed implementation, because
no tombstone implementation has landed. Test pins that every
file SKILL.md cites as same-directory exists (CHANGELOG, README).
SKILL.md claimed its appendix was spliced verbatim from
templates/roles/ by a generation script (see CHANGELOG), but the pack
contained none of the three. Add the nine role sources (mechanically
split from the v0.2 appendix; SKILL.md untouched, zero semantic
change), tools/check_appendix.py (verify + --emit, stdlib only, never
edits SKILL.md), CHANGELOG.md, and test_skill_appendix_provenance.py
(5 tests). Seeding unchanged: skill_seed copies SKILL.md only, so
templates/tools/CHANGELOG never reach the tenant home.
- cloud/merge_gate_hard.py (new): pure hard gate; mode resolution is
env-only (unset/invalid -> hard, fail-closed); five checks plus
branch protection must be protected; unknown/unprotected block
even with explicit confirm; no-evidence blocks (fail-closed);
directory check reuses #209 check_directory_isolation (v0.3 rule);
blocks codes + merge_gate_blocked audit detail are the track-3
pushback interface (no pushback state machine in this track).
- cloud/server.py: POST /tasks/{id}/merge uses hard mode by default;
record/enforce/off only when explicitly set via env (preserving
#209 semantics); body merge_gate_mode is ignored server-side so
callers cannot downgrade the gate; every gate block writes a
merge_gate_blocked audit before returning 409, status unchanged;
hard-mode body type errors return 400.
- docs/merge-gate-branch-protection.md (new): protection payload
(PR + strict status checks + no force-push + no deletion +
enforce_admins), empty required_checks = unconfigured, Pro/public
prerequisites, 403 causes; states protection is NOT claimed enabled.
- SKILL.md (gate-mechanism wording only): four checks -> five checks;
body + coordinator + client appendix gate paragraphs updated to
default hard, merge_gate_blocked audit, payload doc reference.
- tests: 31 new hard-gate tests (pure + endpoint + skill text);
#209 endpoint tests now set record env explicitly (their intent);
test_server_merge 200-path calls now carry full hard evidence.
- cloud/merge_gate.py: pure gate; directory check reuses the v0.3
git diff --name-only merge-base command; protection modes
record (default, explicit confirm required when unprotected),
enforce (always blocks when unprotected), off (explicit only).
Confirm covers protection risk only, never directory violations.
Protection status is caller/env-declared only; unknown is a
recorded risk, not a claim of protection.
- server POST /tasks/{id}/merge: applies the gate only when gate
evidence is supplied (or env declares protection); no-evidence
calls behave as before plus a merge_gate field in the response.
Blocked merges return 409 without changing status; confirmed
unprotected merges write a merge_gate_risk audit entry.
- skill_seed.py: whole-directory seeding evaluated and rejected
(cannot preserve tenant deletions; no benefit while the pack
holds only SKILL.md); SKILL.md-only behaviour unchanged.
- software-engineering SKILL.md: gate paragraph added to the body
and to the coordinator + client appendix sections (v0.2 text on
this base; port to v0.3 text on rebase after #199 merges).
- tests: 16 new tests covering gate modes, directory reuse,
body/appendix bidirectional assertions naming the missing side,
SKILL.md-only seeding and tenant-edit preservation.
Stacked on v0.3 + v0.4 (HEAD d6522ba feat-full-auto): v0.3/v0.4
content preserved, not reverted. Adds G7 post-release ops and
observation (monitoring, errors, cost/quota, feedback, hotfix loop,
rollback triggers, ops manual) and G8 iteration and scaling (v1.1
handover list, contract v1->v2 protocol, new-end onboarding,
scale/performance, deprecation), with G6->G7 and G7->G8 gates,
DAG, gate table, coordinator derivation, G0-G8 todos, checklist,
09-ops and 10-iteration role templates, and ops-manual / v1.1
handover templates in both body and appendix. Settles web+React+
multi-viewport focus, cross-viewport E2E, web single-end release
with iOS/Android native postposed, open-source-first, and the
TypeScript full-stack default (user-request-only language change;
codex-app-server itself stays Python). Pending #199 and #205
merge, then one rebase round. PR only, do not merge or deploy.
- P1-1 directory-isolation executable check: git diff --name-only
against merge-base, output recorded in merge record
- P1-2 derivation checklist table (8 required items, missing one blocks dispatch)
- P1-3 QA split into single-client review and cross-client E2E with
fixed deliverables and agent-test attribution
- P1-4 sub-task slim-pack trimming rules (listed chapters only, never full copies)
- P2: inter-thread Q&A default policy, docs/decisions.md append-only,
per-client onboarding docs (web first at G4a), v1.1 handover checklist
- Body and appendix kept in sync; new lightweight keyword test
- worker._tenant_dirs: playwright refresh log used undefined 'task';
use the method argument project_id (ruff F821, real bug: NameError
aborted tenant seeding when a playwright script was refreshed).
Regression: cloud/tests/test_worker_playwright_seed_f821.py (2 tests;
pre-fix run reproduces NameError at worker.py:2780).
- harness2.assign_ids: hashlib.sha1(..., usedforsecurity=False) -- the
digest is only a deterministic shuffle seed, not a security use;
digest value unchanged, bandit B324 no longer fires (High 5 -> 4).
- harness2.select_final: rename ambiguous loop var 'l' to 'lab'
(ruff E741, behaviour-invariant).
- Deliberately NOT changed: host.py shell=True x4 (see PR body -- all
four are intentional shell commands, changing semantics is unsafe),
remaining ruff 109 / mypy 24, workflow thresholds (75% coverage
gate unchanged; no gate was relaxed or removed).
Replace bare open().read()/write() in tests with Path.read_text/
write_text (or json.loads over read_text); the five remaining
open(...).close() empty-file creations become Path.write_text('').
No assertion, predicate, or production code changed; no behaviour
change beyond closing the handle deterministically.
Long-function splits and server.py module split intentionally not
included: the longest functions (_dispatch, _create_task,
_dispatch_project, ~375-395 lines in a 10430-line server.py) are
central routing/creation paths, and splitting them is not low-risk;
see PR body.
Long-running website monitoring: new cloud/resident.py layer on top of
the automations claim/quota model (no task state-machine change).
States running/paused/ended; pause preserves the content-hash cursor
and stops polling, resume re-checks from the cursor, end is terminal
(resume after end is 409, a new watch is required). Polling is a cheap
fetch + hash comparison; only a real change creates a queued model
task. Quota exhaustion pauses (quota_exceeded) instead of ending and
keeps the cursor. Driver is the worker run_loop round boundary;
server exposes create/list/get/update/pause/resume/end with audit.
Console UI intentionally not wired this round (see verification
summary for deviations).
- search(..., allowed_hosts=[...]) extends (never replaces) the 15-domain
code list for that call only; scope=general + allowed_hosts raises,
empty/illegal values raise before any HTTP, dot-boundary matching,
extension values never in error strings or attempted entries.
- Native-filter parity: Tavily/Exa get the effective list, Perplexity
skips its native filter past its 20-domain cap (post-filter stays
authoritative), Brave/SearXNG/DuckDuckGo rely on post-filtering.
- MCP web_search gains allowed_hosts passthrough (only when supplied,
so older search_fn fakes keep working).
- JS-heavy evaluation documented in docs/web-search-mcp.md, mock-first:
direct fetch is shell-only by construction; provider extract can
supply rendered text in mock only; live SearXNG in this VM env
failed (remote closed connection) and paid-backend live effects are
unvalidated blockers, not claimed.
- Tests: test_code_search_ext (9) + test_js_heavy_extract (5 + 1 live
skipped); existing websearch/code-search suites still green.
(cherry picked from commit 9c26bbe848438e1f34bcb000700aeb4c284f4f23)
- click/click_ref: pre-click allowlist gate on resolvable anchor href
(same check as navigate; miss refuses before the click executes);
click/click_ref/click_at: post-click landing URL check.
click_at has no pre-click gate by design (coordinates name no
element); JS-driven navigation, evaluate, meta refresh and popups
are documented as unintercepable with the Tinyproxy 403 backstop.
- Tenant script upgrade is now safe: only proven-unmodified scripts
(manifest match, 2a569ac known-shipped SHA-256, missing, or
current) auto-merge; tenant-modified scripts are never overwritten,
are reported as skipped, and get one deduped audit record. The
manifest never learns a tenant hash (else the next upgrade would
mistake a modified file for untouched). Idempotent reruns.
- Activation candidate = deployed Tinyproxy programming set encoded
with leading-dot entries (plain entries would regress
docs.python.org); npmjs.org per the deployed filter, not npmjs.com.
Host activation itself is NOT performed this round: only the plan,
validation tests and rollback are delivered.
Tests: 28 new (click 13, upgrade 8, activation 7), all fake/no-network;
98 browser-related tests pass including prior suites.
(cherry picked from commit e4a93f5748ec815f163d0bc096ff4dc4b8c651f5)
- Multi-tab: browser_new_page / browser_list_pages /
browser_switch_page / browser_close_page in playwright_mcp.py;
each new page gets a fresh Playwright context, so cookies and
storage are isolated between pages. Single-page tools act on
the current page; switching to a missing index is an error,
not a crash; closing the last page is an error (use
browser_close).
- Navigation allowlist: BROWSER_ALLOWED_HOSTS (comma list,
leading-dot suffix match, case/port-insensitive) checked in
_check_allowed_url before launching Chromium; unset (or empty)
means no check, the old behaviour. file:// always allowed;
localhost/127.0.0.1 have no special treatment.
- Close cleanup: browser_close closes all pages and best-effort
removes cwd browser-live.png / browser-live.json; custom
screenshot files are untouched. list_pages needs no launch.
- Egress filter: 10 programming-source Tinyproxy BASIC rules
(python.org, nodejs.org, go.dev, pkg.go.dev, rust-lang.org,
developer.mozilla.org, crates.io, stackoverflow.com,
cve.mitre.org, nvd.nist.gov); already-present github.com /
pypi.org / npmjs.org not duplicated; searx.diante.me stays
exact-only, no diante.me wildcard.
- Allowlist worker wiring: _docker_task_context now passes a
set, non-empty BROWSER_ALLOWED_HOSTS from the worker env into
[mcp_servers.playwright.env] in the tenant config, so the MCP
process actually sees it (container -e alone does not reach
MCP subprocesses, 2026-10-30). Unset/empty writes nothing and
never overwrites; the value never goes into logs; it is not
added to the websearch env block or the container env.
ensure_playwright_mcp_env now returns False without rewriting
when the result would be identical (canonical join: one blank
line before the block), so a second prep leaves an unchanged
tenant config alone; other sections untouched.
- Skill + docs: browser-automation SKILL.md multi-tab/allowlist
section; docs/platform-browser.md comparison doc (new file).
- Tests (mock/fake only, no network, no real Chromium, no real
credentials): cloud.tests.test_playwright +
cloud.tests.test_websearch_worker, 48 tests OK, including 6
new wiring tests (switch off passes no variable, switch on
reaches MCP env verbatim, empty never written, old-tenant
merge idempotent + no-rewrite, ensure no-op when identical,
allowlist enforces only after wiring).
- NOT done (see PR body): no persistent profile, no credential
vault, no approval card, no CAPTCHA bypass, in-page link
navigation does not pass the allowlist, no real-Chromium live
verification, host tinyproxy filter not reloaded.
- search(..., scope=code) restricts to 15 programming domains
(official docs, GitHub, registries, Stack Overflow, CVE/NVD):
native include_domains/search_domain_filter where supported
(Tavily, Exa, Perplexity), post-filtering for all providers
(Brave, SearXNG, DuckDuckGo have no native filter).
- web_fetch now uses fetch_best: Tavily extract, then Exa
contents, then direct fetch; both-fail errors name both
failures, direct-fetch 403 under the egress whitelist is
fail-closed, not bypassed. Default general scope and direct
fetch_url behaviour unchanged.
- MCP web_search gains scope enum (general/code); docs updated.
- Tests all mock HTTP, no real keys.
Deploy restarts kill running tasks: the worker marks them
interrupted (worker_shutdown on graceful exit, sweep on stale
reclaim), and auto_resume_interrupted used to accept goal tasks
only, so every non-goal task killed by a deploy stayed
interrupted forever unless a human retried it (the 2026-10-30
demo task died this way).
Now worker_shutdown/sweep interruptions are re-queued for
non-goal tasks too: the platform killed the task, so the
platform re-queues it. The re-queue is a fresh run, not a
breakpoint resume: goal_resume_pending is forced to 0 and any
stale resume_message is cleared, so the new run cannot be
hijacked by the goal-resume path or an old continue message;
files in the same worktree persist. All existing guards stay:
user pause, coordinator orphans, quota (still goal-only),
backoff, the 3-strike stall guard (non-goal tasks have no
checkpoints, so each platform re-queue counts as no-progress),
and the auto_resume_max cap. Other non-goal reasons (NULL,
quota, user cancel) still do not auto-resume.
- AutomationPanel rows now show title, prompt content (160-char preview with expand/collapse), repo_url, last/next run, run_once badge and cancelled time.
- Active automations get an inline edit form (name/prompt/interval/repo) that PATCHes only changed fields via the existing automation_update endpoint; backend semantics unchanged (no last_run_at reset, cancelled stays terminal).
- Rebuilt cloud/console.html with tsc + vite (build green); automation python tests 18/18 OK.
Stale bridge state used to end the stream on the first stale read,
so every round gap and every worker restart killed the watch (the
2026-10-30 demo watch died this way when a 15:03 deploy restarted
the worker). Now a stale state switches to a waiting heartbeat
every 5s while the task is still alive (running/queued/paused/
interrupted), and frames resume when the next round's MCP starts
polling. The stream ends only on a terminal task state, a missing
task row, or 10 minutes of continuous staleness. The panel shows
a waiting status and keeps the last frame. Also force-close the
SSE connection on stream end: HTTP/1.1 keep-alive otherwise left
terminal streams hanging with no EOF.
- cloud/tree.py: structured worktree tree (dirs first, ignore
.git/node_modules, symlinks not followed, entry/depth
truncation flags, text render for injection)
- GET /tasks/{id}/tree with /files auth + worktree resolution,
max_depth 1..5, max_entries 1..500, escape 400, missing 404,
cloud/cross-host 409
- MCP get_task_tree translating to the new endpoint
- worker first-round injection of a repo-checkout top-level
snapshot (2 layers, 120 entries) after repo resolution,
labelled as checkout snapshot not worktree; skipped for
coordinator/resume/fork, silent when no host source
- docs/project-tree.md; tests for tree, endpoint, injection,
MCP translation
host