resolve_registry_agent in cloud/agent_def.py: agent_name may be
<name> or <name>@<version>, agent_version may also be given
separately; both given must agree or 400. Unpinned loads
<name>.json (default); pinned loads <name>.<version>.json and
requires the file's own version field to match, with no silent
fallback to the default file. Version strings are restricted
to alphanumerics/._- (no path separators, no ..); the
agents-dir traversal guard is a second line of defence.
Server: agent_version is only for agent_name (inline agent
with agent_version is 400); stored agent_name is the base
name, not the @ form. Snapshot fixture:
agents/research-brief.v1.json (same content as the default
v1 file). Tests: test_agent_version.py (7 tests).
New pure module cloud/routing_shadow.py: parse worker_routing
audit details (old format without suggested model parses with
suggested unknown, never guessed), evaluate per-tier routed
samples with one-task-one-sample dedup, explicit tasks counted
separately, status under the chosen model, token/USD with
unpriced tokens kept apart, and a min-20 gate per tier. The
report explicitly marks the counterfactual not_measured:
shadow suggested models never ran, so no suggested-vs-chosen
cost/quality comparison is possible. Worker audit detail now
includes suggested/chosen for future rows. GET /routing-shadow
serves the report (project read permission, truncated flag
over 10000 audit rows, cost table ensured so a fresh DB does
not 500).
Tests: test_routing_shadow.py (5 tests).
Agent definitions gain tools (websearch/imagegen/playwright,
unknown tool is a 400), stored as agent_tools JSON and returned
by GET /tasks. This is deliberately required-tools, not an
allowlist: create_thread has no tool allowlist and tenant homes
are per-project shared, so blocking other tools cannot be
claimed. Instead the worker fails fast before any model call
when a declared tool has no [mcp_servers.<tool>] section in
the tenant codex-home config.toml (checked after _tenant_dirs
seeding, so a section seeded earlier by another worker counts
as present). The gate runs only for tenant-isolated Docker
workers; local/cloud workers skip it, documented, not verified.
Tests: test_agent_tools.py (8 tests).
Registry: POST /tasks accepts agent_name, loading <name>.json
from repo-root agents/ (traversal-guarded, skill-pack re-validated);
agent and agent_name together is a 400. Persistence: tasks gains
agent_name/agent_version/agent_instructions (migrate + PG schema),
returned by GET /tasks; stored prompt stays clean. Channel: local
and docker dispatch pass --developer-instructions to host.py
dispatch -> create_thread(developerInstructions=...); run/fork do
not re-send. Cloud executor has no such channel, so the worker
falls back to the v1 marked header in the in-memory dispatch
prompt only (DB prompt stays clean). Goal/coordinator tasks
still reject instructions.
Tests: test_agent_def_v2.py (7 tests) + updated v1 suite.
Agent definition is a versioned JSON document bundling the task
fields this codebase already honours (model/effort/approval/
executor/plan), plus instructions and required skills. At task
creation, explicit body fields win per field over the definition;
unresolved fields stay NULL and follow the worker-default chain
(and rule routing v0 when model is left empty).
Instructions reach the model only as a marked header prepended
to the stored prompt, because the dispatch path has no
developerInstructions channel; goal and coordinator tasks reject
instructions. Skills are validated against the cloud/skills pack
at parse time; seeding itself stays worker-global, documented
as the v1 boundary. Routing policy is not part of a definition
in v1 (worker-global), and unknown fields are rejected so typos
cannot be silently dropped. No new tasks-table column in v1;
definition identity is echoed in the creation response and via
the prompt header.
Tests: test_agent_def.py (11 tests).
Long-running website monitoring: new cloud/resident.py layer on top of
the automations claim/quota model (no task state-machine change).
States running/paused/ended; pause preserves the content-hash cursor
and stops polling, resume re-checks from the cursor, end is terminal
(resume after end is 409, a new watch is required). Polling is a cheap
fetch + hash comparison; only a real change creates a queued model
task. Quota exhaustion pauses (quota_exceeded) instead of ending and
keeps the cursor. Driver is the worker run_loop round boundary;
server exposes create/list/get/update/pause/resume/end with audit.
Console UI intentionally not wired this round (see verification
summary for deviations).
Stale bridge state used to end the stream on the first stale read,
so every round gap and every worker restart killed the watch (the
2026-10-30 demo watch died this way when a 15:03 deploy restarted
the worker). Now a stale state switches to a waiting heartbeat
every 5s while the task is still alive (running/queued/paused/
interrupted), and frames resume when the next round's MCP starts
polling. The stream ends only on a terminal task state, a missing
task row, or 10 minutes of continuous staleness. The panel shows
a waiting status and keeps the last frame. Also force-close the
SSE connection on stream end: HTTP/1.1 keep-alive otherwise left
terminal streams hanging with no EOF.
- cloud/tree.py: structured worktree tree (dirs first, ignore
.git/node_modules, symlinks not followed, entry/depth
truncation flags, text render for injection)
- GET /tasks/{id}/tree with /files auth + worktree resolution,
max_depth 1..5, max_entries 1..500, escape 400, missing 404,
cloud/cross-host 409
- MCP get_task_tree translating to the new endpoint
- worker first-round injection of a repo-checkout top-level
snapshot (2 layers, 120 entries) after repo resolution,
labelled as checkout snapshot not worktree; skipped for
coordinator/resume/fork, silent when no host source
- docs/project-tree.md; tests for tree, endpoint, injection,
MCP translation
GET /tasks/{id}/files previously returned 409 for all docker tasks
on the grounds that tenant docker shares /app/work per project.
Production inspection shows the worker creates a per-task
host-worktrees/<task-id> subdirectory under the tenant work dir
(62 such dirs under the wwww tenant), so per-task reads are
attributable after all: the endpoint now resolves tenant docker
tasks via tenants/<project>/work/host-worktrees/<task-id> (local
worktree as fallback), never serves the shared /app/work mount
itself, and still 409s cloud/cross-host tasks. Docs and the
harness2_tasks boundary notes are updated to match.
- Role models: run_improvement_via_tasks gains role_models
(probe/editor/selector/reflector) plus --model-<role> CLI flags;
missing/empty falls back to shared --model, both empty means
server default, so default behavior is unchanged.
- Sweep: run_sweep + examples/harness2_sweep.py manifest CLI with
shared library_root (library restore), per-run failure isolation
and sweep-report.json summary; preflight gates task creation.
- Deliverable assets: GET /tasks/{id}/files for local-executor
tasks (safe path resolution, UTF-8 text <=256KB, listing <=200;
docker/cloud/cross-host 409 with explicit reason, since tenant
Docker shares one /app/work per project and per-task attribution
would misattribute); probe rollout deliverable_files from the
endpoint plus DELIVERABLE FILE reply blocks (endpoint wins on
collision, bad blocks dropped), surfaced in
deliverables/<label>/files/ context and full_result summary.
- Docs: harness2.md comparison table updated for all three items.
- CODEX_GLOBAL_ADMINS replaces maintainer-derived global admin;
admin endpoints (quotas, sweep, backup, push dispatch) fail-closed
403 when unset, with audit on allow and deny.
- continue/followups/messages/retry check both caller and original
creator quotas (USD + unpriced token cap), 402 on either overrun.
- Quota-less users now get the #86 default quota instead of unlimited;
init_db backfills and OAuth create/bind/existing-login branches
INSERT OR IGNORE a default row; explicit NULL row stays unlimited.
user_quotas added to migration tables.
- /fix-review: untrusted authors rejected before dedup claim, no task;
trusted tasks force executor=docker, created_by=project owner, owner
quota gate, prompt is a fixed template plus a 2000-char excerpt.
- GitHub App setup state only issued by global admins, state rows bind
issued_by (ALTER-compatible for old DBs), callback rejects issuers
no longer in the admin list without consuming the state.
- Cancel: popen poll checks DB status every second, Docker path runs a
cancel watchdog that kills by container name, write-back is CAS-guarded
so late results never overwrite a new status.
- SHELL_ENV_EXCLUDE adds *_TOKEN, *_AUTH*, *_CREDENTIAL*, *API_KEY*;
comment states the residual risk: same-UID /proc environ remains
readable, true isolation needs UID separation or hidepid.
- Tests: new cloud/tests/test_p0_security.py (17 cases); old tests
updated to the new semantics (admin env, default quota, trusted
fix-review author) without weakening any gate.
host