Goal tasks pushed back by the audit loop lost the packet preamble on
the next round: claim-time _apply_audit_loop_packet pasted it into the
in-memory prompt/goal, but the next round collided with the existing
host task name, fell back to breakpoint goal-resume (no --goal-text),
and the host reused the stored goal, discarding the preamble.
Fix (minimal, direction (c) trimmed): host goal-resume gains
--resume-note, accepted only by the breakpoint branch and prepended
to the first turn prompt of this resume only -- never written back
to the stored goal, never touching rounds or verification. The worker
stashes the same preamble as the memory-only _audit_loop_resume_note
at claim time and forwards it on breakpoint resume (Local/Docker
goal_resume_task and the popen goal-resume command, each guarded to
ignore the note when goal_text is set for a new-goal resume).
Accounting untouched: audit 3-round cap, goal_max_rounds/quota, and
DB goal columns are unchanged; non-goal pushback is unchanged.
Tests: cloud/tests/test_audit_n12.py (9 tests) -- host first-turn-only
note + stored-goal/rounds, worker exists-fallback end-to-end with
--resume-note, non-goal regression, goal-column accounting, and
Local/Docker/popen command shapes. Full cloud suite: 1760 OK
(skipped=11), baseline 1751 + 9 new; tests/test_host.py: 62 OK.
Registry: POST /tasks accepts agent_name, loading <name>.json
from repo-root agents/ (traversal-guarded, skill-pack re-validated);
agent and agent_name together is a 400. Persistence: tasks gains
agent_name/agent_version/agent_instructions (migrate + PG schema),
returned by GET /tasks; stored prompt stays clean. Channel: local
and docker dispatch pass --developer-instructions to host.py
dispatch -> create_thread(developerInstructions=...); run/fork do
not re-send. Cloud executor has no such channel, so the worker
falls back to the v1 marked header in the in-memory dispatch
prompt only (DB prompt stays clean). Goal/coordinator tasks
still reject instructions.
Tests: test_agent_def_v2.py (7 tests) + updated v1 suite.
2026-10-29 task 2 lost its host-state entry (version 390 -> single
digits) while running under Docker/gVisor. Root cause, proven live:
- save_state tmp name contained only pid, and every containerized
host.py runs as pid 1, so concurrent writers shared one tmp file
and interleaved writes produced corrupt JSON;
- fcntl.flock does not exclude across runsc containers sharing a
bind-mounted lock file (both entered at 0.0s in a live probe);
- _read_state_file silently treated corrupt JSON as empty state, so
the next save legitimately rewrote the file with only the
surviving writer's tasks.
Fix:
- tmp name now hostname + pid + thread + uuid4 (backup tmp same);
- mkdir atomic lock replaces flock (atomic on the host fs, holds
across bind mounts/gofer), with stale-lock recovery after 120s
and a loud timeout instead of unlocked writes; reads need no lock
because publication is tmp + os.replace;
- save path uses a strict disk read: corrupt JSON, non-object top
level, or wrong-shaped tasks/automations now raise instead of
overwriting (recovery stays with restore_state + .bak).
Tests: tests/test_host_state_lock.py, 7 items (tmp uniqueness in
process and across processes, 8-process concurrent saves all
survive with version 8, stale lock recovery, fresh lock timeout
raises, corrupt/wrong-shaped disk refuses to overwrite).
Full suites: cloud 1168 (skipped 4), host 104, deploy 39, all green.
- CODEX_GLOBAL_ADMINS replaces maintainer-derived global admin;
admin endpoints (quotas, sweep, backup, push dispatch) fail-closed
403 when unset, with audit on allow and deny.
- continue/followups/messages/retry check both caller and original
creator quotas (USD + unpriced token cap), 402 on either overrun.
- Quota-less users now get the #86 default quota instead of unlimited;
init_db backfills and OAuth create/bind/existing-login branches
INSERT OR IGNORE a default row; explicit NULL row stays unlimited.
user_quotas added to migration tables.
- /fix-review: untrusted authors rejected before dedup claim, no task;
trusted tasks force executor=docker, created_by=project owner, owner
quota gate, prompt is a fixed template plus a 2000-char excerpt.
- GitHub App setup state only issued by global admins, state rows bind
issued_by (ALTER-compatible for old DBs), callback rejects issuers
no longer in the admin list without consuming the state.
- Cancel: popen poll checks DB status every second, Docker path runs a
cancel watchdog that kills by container name, write-back is CAS-guarded
so late results never overwrite a new status.
- SHELL_ENV_EXCLUDE adds *_TOKEN, *_AUTH*, *_CREDENTIAL*, *API_KEY*;
comment states the residual risk: same-UID /proc environ remains
readable, true isolation needs UID separation or hidepid.
- Tests: new cloud/tests/test_p0_security.py (17 cases); old tests
updated to the new semantics (admin env, default quota, trusted
fix-review author) without weakening any gate.
Real bad-model turn: relay returns 404, codex retries sampling
5 times, turn fails, but app-server's turn/completed event
carries status=failed with NO error and NO text, so worker
never saw any fallbackable signal. The 404 actually lives in
codex's thread_history_1.sqlite (thread_turns.error_json).
host.py Server.run_turn now best-effort recovers that message
(read-only query by thread_id+turn_id, any failure -> None,
never breaks the turn itself), and dispatch CLI prints the
error field (run CLI already printed the full result). Worker
_attempt_error prefers the error field when text is empty, so
a double failure keeps the real reasons, not just status codes.
Tests: host TurnErrorFromHistoryTest (recovery + missing/corrupt
DB -> None), full host + cloud suites pass.
Extend the verify job with a second step running cloud tests, so
CI covers both suites (host 27 + cloud 223, both passing locally
outside the model sandbox; the 40 socket failures reported inside
the sandbox were sandbox artifacts, not code failures).
Generator (host.py HOST_VERIFY_WORKFLOW) and generated workflow
were updated together; template matches the generated file.
host